Robbins Remembered and Dismembered, Contextualising the Anniversary

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Abstract

This polemical paper was motivated by its author’s concern that the United Kingdom Coalition higher education minister, Willetts, should claim at recent quinquageniary commemorations of the publication of the 1963 Robbins Report to be preserving its legacy for higher education. By contrast, this paper argues that the period of reform aimed at changing society through education marked by Robbins has been closed by the Coalition government’s acceptance of the 2010 Browne Review recommendations. The paper is therefore little concerned with the contents of the report but places it in a wider context ending in the current attempted reversal towards a minority higher education with academic schooling dominant throughout the system. In a still greater reversal, the expansion of state over private provision characteristic of the 50-year period of reform of education, is also being reversed towards a state-subsidised privatisation at all levels of learning. In conclusion some alternatives are suggested.

Introduction

The 2010 Browne Review and following White Paper, even without subsequent legislation (McGettigan, 2013), marks the end, not only of higher education as it has developed since the war but, more broadly, of the whole effort to reform society through education. It closes a phase of progressive reform that began in 1963 with Robbins’ recommendation of the expansion of higher education beyond the limited pool who were previously considered educable to all ‘qualified by ability and attainment’ to benefit. This is the celebrated Robbins’ principle that, as Shattock shows in this issue, was assumed rather than recommended by the Report (Robbins, 1963, para. 31). Nevertheless, it officially junked the previous tripartite selection by supposedly ‘scientific’ but by then discredited IQ-testing of Platonic types of gold, silver and bronze
children who were allocated different types of the state secondary schooling established after the war. This was before the new 1964 Labour government’s Circular 10/65 invited local education authorities to do likewise and comprehensivise.

The reasons for Robbins’ recommendation were not primarily economic. Indeed, his committee rejected a ‘manpower planning’ approach in favour of a ‘student demand model’ based on demographic and educational trends (Willetts, 2013). They also considered fees for funding expansion but rejected this because, as Willetts does not mention, this was considered unnecessary with the system of progressive taxation that then existed. Certainly, Robbins was not a ‘human capitalist’, though the topsy-turvy idea, as it appeared, that investment in people through training and education could precede capital investment was first presented in Becker’s book (Becker, 1964) a year later in 1964. Rather than lead a ‘knowledge economy’ (Levine, 2013), for Robbins, education should keep pace with a growing economy. Indeed, it has been a commonplace of commentary to compare the inverse relation between the diminishing sizes of the respective Robbins, Dearing (1997) and Browne (2010) reports/review with the growing proportion of them devoted to economic justification. Thus, Robbins not only argued for an expanded system, he also took a generous view of the wider public benefits of a skilled and educated work force. Indeed, he endorsed higher education’s role in producing ‘cultivated men and women’, securing the advancement of learning through the combination of teaching and research and providing a common culture and standards of citizenship. By comparison, Dearing introduced the idea that students might be asked to pay part of the costs of their degrees but still preserved the wider purposes of higher education shared with Robbins to:

- sustain a culture which demands disciplined thinking, encourages curiosity, challenges existing ideas and generates new ones; [and] be part of the conscience of a democratic society, founded on respect for the rights of the individual and the responsibilities of the individual to society as a whole.

(Dearing, 1997, paragraph 5)

In contrast, Browne (2010) commended education only for its contribution to the economy and as a private investment in human capital and extended a welcome to for-profit providers despite their lack of commitment to the public values of a university education.

Nevertheless, Robbins preserved a system in which academic selection was moved up the age range from 11+ to 14+. This became the
new age at which those leaving secondary schooling at 15 or 16 (after 1972) were separated from those with the possibility of proceeding through sixth form to A-levels and university entry. In England and Wales higher education was thus still not an entitlement or even expectation for all who graduated high school. Unlike the republican French and original United States model, university entry still depended upon characteristically English selectivity; as Brighouse quips in one of his many bon mots, this follows the rule that ‘No matter how far you go in the English education system, they’ll fail you in the end!’ So, the official introduction of comprehensive schools from 1965 was not accompanied by the curricular reform advocated by, among others, Williams (1961) in The Long Revolution. As a result, comprehensives were left competing for still selective university entry with the surviving grammars and private schools on the uneven playing field of academic A-levels, even after the introduction of a common school-leaving examination at 16 in 1986.

However, in the years following Robbins raising the age of selection freed primary schools for Plowden’s child-centred education. There was also further growth of further and technical education, consequent upon Robbins’ recommended elevation of the Colleges of Advanced Technology to university status, which created space for other institutions to ‘move up’; for instance, from being colleges of further education to becoming colleges of further and higher education. Unlike 11+ selection, which became a thing of the past in 80 per cent of English secondary schools and more in Wales and Scotland, reforming state education at all levels no longer aimed to reinforce existing social hierarchies but to break down class divisions by opening equal opportunities to careers for all. The logic of comprehensive reform carried forward to inclusion of children with special needs, a common examination at 16 and a national curriculum presented to teachers as an entitlement for all, as well as, more recently, widening participation in higher education to nearly half of 18–30 year olds.

Now the worst-case scenario of a cap-free market in fees, variable by course and institution, could leave arts and humanities to overseas students and others who are seriously rich at elite and surviving campus universities. Other universities and colleges could reduce down to their technical departments for as long as science, technology, engineering and medicine (STEM) subjects remain centrally funded, the rest merging into local e-learning hubs proffering two-year degrees by part-time and distance provision; if they are not bought-out or taken-over (McGettigan, 2013). Instead of secondary level divisions
between grammar, technical and secondary modern state schools, tripartite division has moved up the education hierarchy to tertiary level to distinguish internationally selecting and researching universities from nationally recruiting and mainly teaching campus universities as against what are becoming locally clearing and training institutions (Weyers and Ainley, 2008). This leads to the market-driven Great Reversal (Allen and Ainley, 2013) to a minority higher education and a society in which, in the absence of practical application of what is learnt, academic tests of levels of literacy act as proxies for more-or-less expensively acquired cultural capital as education becomes the main means of social control over the young in the absence of a wage. This simulacrum of learning is aimed at the impossible project of restarting the limited upward social mobility from the working- to the middle-class that existed for almost 30 years in a growing economy and expanding welfare state after the war. ‘The new situation’, as Roberts described it in 2010, ‘is that the majority of the young people who succeed in education today have started life in positions from which ascent is difficult to achieve. For them, any mobility is most likely to be downwards.’ (Roberts, 2010, np) This reality is disguised by, on the one hand, reinventing largely spurious and oversubscribed ‘apprenticeships’ that most employers do not want and that do not lead to jobs (Allen, 2014) and, on the other, reintroducing ‘a grammar school education for all’, if not grammar schools themselves, and/or vouchers plus privatised state schools, alongside colleges and universities for which fees function as de facto vouchers.

So what went wrong?

Following ‘the pervasiveness of self-blame’ that reveals ‘the degree to which the self-perpetuating features of the academic system are introjected by one group of its victims’ (Aronowitz and DiFazio, 1994, p. 256), teachers often blame themselves. For, despite Bernstein’s (1970) warning that ‘education cannot compensate for society’, school, college and university teachers typically had an idealistic opinion that it could. This was partly because of their own experiences of education, particularly higher education, which grew from around 2 per cent, mostly young men, after the war to around 7 per cent, including a growing proportion of women, by the time the post-war generation of baby-boomers went to university in the late 1960s. This was a generation of students most of whose parents, even if middle class, did not themselves go to higher education but these students’ higher education experience confirmed them as part of the growing middle class even if
they were not already. The new universities associated with Robbins but
founded before his report by the University Grants Committee, aimed to
spread (more thinly, their detractors said) traditional higher education in
the arts, humanities and social sciences, while elevating the Colleges of
Advanced Technology to universities. Instead of more such universities,
the polytechnics from 1965–1992 aimed at both a higher education on
the cheap and a new higher education for adult students living locally (as
in Robinson, 1968) but introduced a new binary divide at tertiary level
just as it was being phased out at secondary. Despite some brave
experiments, for example, independent study at the University of East
London, this proved illusory (Robbins, 1988). So too did the latest
phase of widening participation to higher education sustained on a
reduced unit of resource from 2003–2011 by more illusions, this time
in the transformative powers of new information and communications
technology to include nearly half of 18–30 women at least. Admissions
overall were down about 10 per cent in 2012 but have recovered
somewhat in 2013 to 38 per cent of all 18–19 year-olds in England
progressing to some sort of higher education (42% of females and 34% of males) (HEFCE, 2013, p. 10).

However, as Collini (2013) wrote in The London Review of Books on
the 24th October, ‘Anyone who thinks the change in 2010 was merely
a rise in fees, and that things have settled down and will now carry
on much as usual, simply hasn’t been paying attention.’ Nearly all
universities raised their entry thresholds for 2012 and in 2013 many
brought them down again. Even so, all but Oxford, Cambridge and
London School of Economics did not fill all their courses this year
with students who met the A-level grades required for entry to
different courses at different institutions but were forced into taking
some with qualifications below those asked for; known as ‘clearing’.
This left others in the expanded self-styled ‘Russell Group’ of 24 ‘top
universities’ competing to attract the ‘core’ group of students with
AAB A-level grades that the government last year allowed universities
to compete for, instead of allocating each institution fixed numbers.
This was extended to ABBs this year. Some, for example, the
University of Southampton and the University of Liverpool, lost out
badly in 2012 as others, for example, the University of Bristol, took
in extra numbers. The ‘Real Russells’, (Oxbridge plus London School
of Economics), by contrast with all the others in the group,
characteristically continue to restrict their undergraduate intake so as
to increase demand and leave their academics more room for research,
heightening their value further. This year the academic competition is
even more ferocious and will become even more so when all student number controls are lifted in 2015 (as announced in 5th December 2013 autumn budget statement). Meanwhile at the ‘margin’, where competition has also been allowed and encouraged by government, as well as at ‘the core’, applicants living at home whilst studying locally have not materialised in the numbers anticipated for those universities at the bottom of the pile to keep their admissions totals up. In any case, few universities have been prepared to lower their fees to the £7,500 required by government and the Higher Education Funding Council for England to compete with the further and higher education colleges for these approximately 20,000 students.

Nevertheless, because student loans for fees do not have to be repaid for so long, and only then if earning above the median wage, ‘customers’ (students) are still applying: although some whole groups have been lost (adults –40% and part-timers –14% since 2010, as well as many white working-class males) (HEFCE, 2013, p. 10). This pattern of applications could change if repayment terms are altered by government to subsidise the sale of more of the student loan book, which was also announced by the Chancellor on the 5th December; or if repayments were to begin at a lower threshold, say £18,000 instead of £21,000. The government will have to do something (Hutton, 2013) since it has already acknowledged it does not expect more than a third of what will be a £191 billion debt to be recovered by 2046 when outstanding balances will begin to be written off (McGettigan, 2013). (By which time, according to Mora et al., (2013) in Nature, large parts of the world will be entering ‘unprecedented climate states’, among other predictable events of equally incalculable consequence.)

No wonder Willetts is under pressure from the Exchequer to reduce this increasing additional government debt; especially as he has also allowed student borrowing for sub-degree private colleges and universities to mushroom, necessitating a sudden cut-back that left many of these private institutions ‘in chaos’, according to Malik and McGettigan (2013). Willetts’ initial hopes of reducing student numbers drastically have not been achieved because the first or upper-second class degree now obtained by half of graduates has become the new threshold demanded by employers for entry to perhaps half of all jobs available to young people. So it is worth becoming indebted up to £27k student loan plus maintenance loan plus 3 per cent interest on top of the rate of inflation on both, adding up to a National Union of Students’ estimated average of £50k. On the other hand, the denouement Hutton foresees:
Oxford, Cambridge and a handful of other top English universities will want to charge more than £9,000 to support their expensive teaching, while trying not to deter applicants by offering even more generous fee rebates and scholarships to undergraduates and graduates from disadvantaged backgrounds. They would preserve themselves in the short term as premier academic institutions. But they would have caused an interdependent university system to fragment, leaving less strong universities in an impossible position …

may be precisely the policy intention.

The ostensible object of the whole exercise, vocationalism, which supposedly now guides student choice, was originally deployed in the 1970s as a progressive critique of the ‘irrelevant’ and selective academicism preserved by Robbins. It was appropriated in the 1980s by claims for the vocational relevance of the youth training that attempted to substitute for the collapse of industrial apprenticeships (Ainley and Corney, 1990). From there its language of ‘transferable skills’ permeated all levels of learning until then Prime Minister Thatcher could declare to her last party conference that the battle for the economic future would be won ‘in Britain’s classrooms’ by teaching the future generations of workers to spell properly! Similarly, Gove (Secretary of State for Education) holds lack of ‘rigorous’ assessment in the examination system responsible for the United Kingdom economy’s ‘failure to compete’ with Pacific Rim countries.

As for research, which Weaver indicated (Weaver, 1974) is often mistaken to be privileged as ‘knowledge production’ over teaching as ‘knowledge reproduction’ within higher education, as well as over schools and colleges, as Harvey noted as long ago as 1986 in The Condition of Postmodernity (Harvey, 1986, p. 160),

the universities in the industrially developed countries are shifting from being guardians of national knowledge to ancillaries in the production of knowledge for global corporations.

Marketised by successive research assessment and research excellence exercises or framework,

Research selectivity has been used not just to concentrate research funding but to restructure the system by determining institutional missions and status. (Brown and Carasso, 2013, p. 134)

Meanwhile, in the new mixed economy, private sector penetration of increasingly entrepreneurial public universities is perverting the 1918 Haldane principle that research council funds should be allocated on the basis of academic criteria, not political or economic considerations.
This is producing new medico-industrial university complexes far removed from Polanyian ideals of ‘communities of science’. Many science students, moreover, have long graduated to be lab-technicians if they do not go in for teaching (Ainley, 1994); while many engineering departments in further and higher education have, over the years, closed for lack of employment for their students (Ainley and Bailey, 1997). Traditional empiricism still inhibits cross-disciplinarity and public intellectuality, so that science and higher education generally has reneged on its role of critically learning from the past in order not to repeat it in the future—particularly in relation to climate change (Ainley, 2008).

This did not all happen just because post-modernists lost the plot, even though the post-structuralist ‘turn’ that took over the academy created a new academic orthodoxy, replacing Weber and Parsons with Foucault in the social sciences. This resulted in an ideological misapprehension of wider changes that were taking place in Western society. The resulting Fragmentary Class Structure, as Roberts and his fellow investigators called it in 1977, was a consequence of economic and technical shifts in employment triggered by the falling rate of profit and change in the organic composition of capital but imposed by policies leading to a new form of deregulated state open to the new global economy in place of the national Keynesian welfare state. Combining a free market with strong central control, this ‘new market-state’ (Bobbitt, 2002) is exemplified in English education to all levels, which has changed from being a national system of schools and colleges locally administered to a national system nationally administered to include higher education (Ainley, 2001). It operates on the principal that power contracts to the centre whilst responsibility is contracted out to semi-privatised but state-subsidised ‘delivery units’, as the schools, colleges and universities have become. Yet, with the important exception of higher education fees, most services remaining in the public sector were not ‘monetized’, that is, they remain for the most part ‘free at the point of delivery’, as successive governments have had it in relation especially to the National Health Service. They were, however, thoroughly marketised by the end of New Labour’s period in office. By contrast, the £1,000 a year fee introduced for home students in 1997 on Dearing’s recommendation was subsequently twice tripled to shift funding away from the block grant ‘towards a system in which funding followed the student’ (Brown and Carasso, 2013, p. 83), along with the final abolition of the maintenance grant in 1999. Meanwhile, public spending on education, particularly on schools, was increased by the previous Labour governments of Prime Ministers Blair and Brown.
The Coalition of Willetts and Gove represents a different approach. Despite their reported mutual antipathy, they both aim at a *Great Reversal* to the 1950s academic selection of a minority. The failure of the majority that this entails is ‘a recipe for more riots’ (Allen and Ainley, 2013, p. 54); especially as, ‘The conditions that gave rise to citizens taking to the streets and capable of the scenes we witnessed’ (John, 2011) in the 2011 English urban riots have not changed and have still not received the explanation that Professor Gus John demanded in his unpublished and so far unanswered *Open Letter to Prime Minister Cameron* that August. These riots can be seen as the crystallisation of an on-going process of class reformation in which education and training to all levels has played a crucial role, not least in ‘widening participation’ to higher education from 2003–11.

Widening participation has not led to fair or equal access to equal types of higher education or outcomes in the labour market. Nor has it increased social mobility to change lives as academics sometimes fancy that they do. In fact, the opposite is the case; as elsewhere in education, the system functions to keep people in their place. Social divisions are heightening and hardening in higher education, where the general rule is that the older the university, the younger, whiter, more male and posher its students. More black and minority ethnic applicants may enter higher education but they graduate with lower grades at lower status institutions, so that, as David (2009, pp. 4–5) italicises for emphasis, ‘these policies [of widening participation] have not led to fair or equal access to equal types of higher education or outcomes in the labour market’, as there are ‘systemic and systematic forms of inequality for individuals and institutions across subjects and levels of education’ (David, 2009, p. 150).

Yet, widening participation was a very popular policy, especially with parents who had not themselves experienced higher education. It presented itself as a professionalisation of the proletariat while disguising a proletarianisation of the professions, as automation leading to the deskilling and outsourcing that were evident to Braverman amongst United States craft workers in 1974 has worked its way up the employment hierarchy to previously secure professions. This includes notably an academic profession reduced towards the conditions of wage labour, with zero-hours contracts for many teachers and most researchers on a series of short-term, insecure contracts. School teachers are another case in point, professionalising themselves by association with higher education departments of education from their original location in further education trade training colleges (a move now being reversed by Gove back to an apprentice training model in schools).
However, with ‘standards’ or what are really training competences dictated and inspected by central government agency, teacher training is also an example of increasingly prevalent higher education reduced to further education as education turns into training. (This is not to disparage further education: indeed further education and higher education would ideally combine in what Silver, (2004) called ‘thick higher education’, going ‘further’ at the same time as going ‘higher’. Nor does it fail to recognise that one cannot have education without training but one can, and increasingly does, have training without education.)

Possibly, ‘the schools workforce’ as the New Labour government began calling it, exemplifies the new correspondence with employment (if there is such a correspondence between education and employment and education has not largely become economically dysfunctional) for many higher education students are nowadays lucky to graduate to similar service sector professional and paraprofessional employment as is available in schools as teachers or their assistants. What they have studied has little relevance as, in the hierarchy of higher education institutions competing with their ‘diverse’ specialisms, ‘student choice’ is increasingly reduced to choosing from a range of loosely-related modules on the business studies model for many modularised courses that cohere, if at all, only on their vocational relevance (Brady, 2012). Meanwhile, traditional disciplines assert their integrity as claims to quality in the competition for prestige (Naidoo, 2003). In both cases, student motivations are increasingly instrumental and performative but arguably in the majority have never been anything else. As Allen points out (2013, p. 73). ‘Pupils and students will do anything they have to to get the grades they need’. Even becoming indebted up to £50k in hopes of the ‘15 per cent higher lifetime earnings than people with lower qualifications’ that the Million+ group of former-polytechnic universities estimate as their ‘graduate premium’ for one of the approximately 40 per cent of occupations in the economy that have reportedly become ‘graduatised’, meaning open to graduates only, (Hadfield et al., 2012), bumping other less qualified applicants further down the jobs queue.

This desperate student instrumentality is having the unintended outcome of corrupting relations between teachers and taught at all levels as lecturers also are locked into a simulacrum of learning that has less and less to do with students’ real lives and experiences as they pay more for less (McArds-Clinton, 2008). In a state of ‘prolonged youth’ (Bynner, 2013), if not of Emerging Adulthood (Arnett, 2000), nearly all these younger students work their way from sixth-form and college on to part-time and temporary contract employment, often living with or
returning to their parents and not achieving ‘independent’ parenthood until their mid-30s (if then) let alone the distant prospect of a career as they run up a down-escalator of inflating qualifications.

Young people lacking other opportunities seek *The Pleasures of Being a Student* (Cheeseman, 2011) on an increasingly pre-packaged ‘experience’ without much thought to what they will do afterwards when many inevitably return to their parental homes. This may especially apply to young women, who may have more motivation to leave home, fewer other opportunities and are generally better qualified for entry. They have been the majority in most subjects, including prestigious ones like medicine and law, in higher education worldwide for some time (Leathwood and Read, 2009). For those nominally ‘full-time’ students who live at home to save money, attending local higher education is often peripheral to their social lives and supposedly ‘part-time’ work. Yet still parents and teachers, schools and colleges urge students on to what many of them see as a *Triumph of Emptiness* (Alvesson, 2013). Rather than challenging the ‘functional stupidity’ to which Alvesson sees education, mass entertainment, the media and especially advertising, contributing, much (higher) education sustains a socially supported lack of reflexivity, substantive reasoning, and justification [that] ... means you refrain from critical thinking, reflection and the posing of broader questions about values, ideals, and representations of reality. (Alvesson, 2013, pp. 216–217)

**So what are the alternatives?**

The market is so omnivorous even radical initiatives, like efforts at Lincoln University (Neary et al., 2011) to do away with grading, tend to get assimilated as brands if they are successful. System-wide reform is therefore necessary (Burns, 2012) as well as larger social change, such as return to progressive taxation rather than any proposed graduate tax in place of fees, even reduced ones (to £6,000 as Labour proposed—though whether this is still their policy or whether they would ever implement it in government is not clear). Scott (2013) at the Brighton University Convention for Higher Education was surely right to call for ‘a revival of radical thinking about higher education’, whilst ‘accepting that higher education needed reform but not this reform’. (Cf. Camila Vallejo, the Chilean student leader, widely quoted on the Internet as saying, ‘We want to improve the educational system but not this one.’) Therefore, to celebrate and not apologise for a mass system and fight for an increase in student numbers not ‘consolidation’—‘the job is only half done!’ as Scott said. This is not to demand everyone necessarily attends
higher education at 18 (not everyone wants to, including many of those who are there!) but that there should be a universal right to do so based on a general certificate of high school graduation. This will require what Spours and Hodgson (2012) call a unified and ecosystem vision of schools and colleges in relation to universities (also Simmons, 2013 proposal for a return to the 1980 Macfarlane Report’s proposals for further education in relation to schools and higher education).

For students for whom, as Graff (2003, p. 274) remarks, ‘the very words “education” and “academic” are opaque’, the whole point of university has to be represented. In Scottish and American universities a first-year foundation presents opportunities that are impossible in England (necessary and desirable though this might be to bring students up to speed, especially in mathematics) because it would represent an extra year’s fee. Such inductions could begin to address the crisis of student (academic) literacy. This is combined with one of legitimacy as the widened student body desperately hopes their expensively purchased degrees will gain them more than ‘a McJob’ on graduation. This at least forced some academics to agree what is important in the subjects they taught as they sought to adapt tertiary level learning to new generations of students in the way comprehensive school teachers previously struggled to open secondary schooling to the mass of the population. That such efforts were first made in ‘The Bad Universities’, as defined negatively by The Times ‘Good University Guide’, contributes to the denigration of such efforts, seen by the élite as abandoning ‘academic standards’.

Moreover, it is in these ‘least middle-class’ (as my own university was described in a Times Higher league table it could have come top of had it been rephrased as ‘most working-class’) institutions that the pressure is on to reduce traditional programmes towards two-year degrees, either as two-year Foundation programmes or as three-year courses delivered over two years to include the summer in order to utilise plant and staff more efficiently. Or merely as preliminary to postgraduate (perhaps doctoral) ‘real higher education’, as it is widely regarded in the USA, since so many taught Masters now turn around in one year. These are also the institutions where most nominally ‘full-time’ students live locally but are in part-time if not full-time employment: sometimes in several part-time jobs simultaneously (O’Leary, 2013). Their students also have the greatest educational needs and disabilities such as dyslexia (over-diagnosed though this probably is). Raised and differentiated fees will heighten instead of concealing these differences. To overcome them, there should be an emphasis upon the contribution to knowledge.
that students can make in their chosen academic disciplines or fields of practice through independent research, scholarship, creation or application in the form of their final-year dissertation. This in essence is the answer to the vexed question of research in higher education: research must be generalised to as many teachers and students as possible, including in schools, colleges and adult continuing education.

This does not preclude dedicated specialist research institutes such as already exist, especially for large scientific research institutes, but in general teaching should be combined with research as a means of introducing students to an academic community that critically learns from the past to change behaviour in the future. The undergraduate dissertation can then be developed to emphasise the contribution that students can make to that continuing cultural conversation as the final degree demonstration of higher-level graduateness. Such development will widen the still available critical space afforded by higher education in which a defence of the public university can be conducted (Holmwood, 2011). This should bring together staff and students, instead of antagonising them as putting customers/students at the heart of the system as the 2011 White Paper claims to do (BIS, 2011). Nor can (higher) education be merely for its own sake (as Collini suggested in 2012). It is much more important than that!

As UNESCO’s 1997 Resolution on Higher Education states: ‘higher education is directed to human development and to the progress of society’. In a democratic society, deciding on the nature of development and progress (increasingly to recognise what is necessary for human survival and how to ensure it), is the common practice of citizens for which compulsory education should not only prepare them for assumption of full and independent citizenship at 18 but engage them in from the earliest years. Such a general education should also be informed by the discussion, research and scholarship preserved and developed by post-compulsory further, higher and adult continuing education in a process of critical cultural transmission, creation and recreation.

References


